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______ 
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______ 
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        Appellant 
______ 
         
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Criminal No. 07-cr-613) 
District Judge: Hon. Susan D. Wigenton 
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 17, 2010 
 
Before: JORDAN, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: December 22, 2010 ) 
______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
          
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
 Tyshaun St. Vallier (“St. Vallier”) was convicted of one count of knowingly and 
intentionally importing 500 grams or more of cocaine into the United States in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 960(b)(2)(B), and one count of conspiracy to import 500 
grams or more of cocaine into the United States contrary to 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 
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960(b)(2)(B), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963.  Pursuant to this conviction, the District 
Court sentenced St. Vallier to 204 months of imprisonment.  St. Vallier appeals his 
conviction and sentence contending that: (1) the District Court erred by denying his 
motion to suppress statements made to customs officers in Newark Liberty International 
Airport; (2) the District Court erred by preventing the impeachment of a key prosecution 
witness; (3) the Government violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by knowingly 
using perjured testimony; (4) the District Court erred by precluding the introduction of 
certain evidence at trial; (5) the District Court erred by denying his motion for a new trial; 
(6) defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance; and (7) the District Court abused its 
discretion by imposing a procedurally and substantively unreasonable sentence.   
Based on our conclusion that the District Court committed no error at trial, that the 
Government did not knowingly use perjurious testimony, and that St. Vallier‟s ineffective 
assistance claims are unready for review on direct appeal, we will affirm St. Vallier‟s 
judgment of conviction.  We will, however, vacate St. Vallier‟s sentence and remand for 
resentencing due to a procedural error committed by the District Court.   
I. 
 Because we write solely for the parties‟ benefit, we assume familiarity with the 
case and discuss only those facts relevant to our decision. 
 On May 6, 2007, St. Vallier, along with co-conspirators Ezra McCombs 
(“McCombs”) and Charisse LaRoche (“LaRoche”), traveled from Port of Spain, Trinidad 
to Newark, New Jersey.  Upon arrival at Liberty International Airport in Newark, each 
individual proceeded to separate customs lines.  Unbeknownst to them, officers working 
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for United States Customs and Border Protection had flagged them for secondary 
inspection.  Accordingly, customs officers escorted all three individuals to a secondary 
inspection area of the airport.  On the way, St. Vallier was taken to the baggage claim to 
retrieve his single checked item of luggage.  
Following arrival in the secondary inspection area, Customs Officer Jorje Erraez 
questioned St. Vallier.  In response to Officer Erraez‟s questions, St. Vallier indicated 
that he had travelled to Trinidad for vacation.  He additionally stated that he knew 
McCombs, but denied knowing LaRoche.  Officer Erraez thereafter confronted St. Vallier 
with a copy of LaRoche‟s travel itinerary, which he had located in St. Vallier‟s single 
checked luggage bag.  St. Vallier then acknowledged knowing LaRoche, and stated that 
she was McCombs‟ girlfriend.  No Miranda warnings were provided prior to questioning 
St. Vallier.  
Upon discussion, Officer Erraez and other customs officers who had separately 
interviewed LaRoche and McCombs discovered inconsistencies in each individual‟s 
responses.  Notably, McCombs stated that LaRoche was St. Vallier‟s girlfriend, directly 
contradicting St. Vallier.  Based on this and other inconsistencies, Officer Erraez 
obtained permission from his supervisor to conduct a personal search of St. Vallier. 
Although no contraband was found, Officer Erraez located a credit card used to acquire 
LaRoche‟s plane ticket and several thousand dollars in cash.   
Meanwhile, based on inconsistent statements made by LaRoche, customs officers 
obtained permission to search three suitcases checked in her name.  Customs officers 
discovered within a large amount of powder and liquid cocaine.  LaRoche was then 
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escorted to a personal search room where she admitted to concealing cocaine inside her 
body as well.  In addition, LaRoche made statements implicating St. Vallier in the 
smuggling plan.  In total, 3,280 grams of liquid and powder cocaine were seized from 
LaRoche‟s three suitcases and body.   
Upon learning that customs officials had discovered cocaine, Officer Erraez 
ceased questioning and searching St. Vallier.  Shortly thereafter, agents from Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) arrested both St. Vallier and McCombs.  ICE 
provided St. Vallier a written statement of rights including Miranda warnings.  St. Vallier 
chose to exercise his Miranda rights.    
On July 24, 2007, a grand jury sitting in Newark, New Jersey, returned a two-
count indictment against St. Vallier charging him with one count of knowingly and 
intentionally importing 500 grams or more of cocaine into the United States in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 960(b)(2)(B), and one count of conspiracy to import 500 
grams or more of cocaine into the United States contrary to 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 
960(b)(2)(B), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963.  After pleading not-guilty, St. Vallier failed 
to appear for a scheduled court date.  Accordingly, on November 20, 2008, the grand jury 
returned a superseding indictment adding a third count charging St. Vallier with willfully 
failing to appear, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(i).  St. Vallier was 
subsequently apprehended by authorities and plead guilty to that offense. 
Prior to trial, St. Vallier filed a motion to suppress statements he made to customs 
officials during the questioning conducted in the secondary inspection area of Liberty 
International Airport.  St. Vallier contended that these statements were made while he 
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was subject to custodial interrogation, thus entitling him to warnings as required by 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  Because no such warnings were provided 
prior to questioning, he argued that the statements made to customs officials were 
inadmissible at trial.  The District Court rejected this argument and denied St. Vallier‟s 
motion. 
Trial commenced on April 23, 2009.  Five days later the jury returned a guilty 
verdict on both counts of importation and conspiracy to import cocaine.  Thereafter, St. 
Vallier filed a motion for a new trial arguing, inter alia, that the court erred by allegedly 
preventing him from impeaching McCombs regarding testimony on St. Vallier‟s use of a 
specific cellular phone to make calls and text messages to Trinidad in furtherance of the 
drug importation conspiracy.  St. Vallier additionally argued that testimony provided by 
ICE Agent Riley left the jury with the false impression that funds seized from St. Vallier 
on the day of his arrest were narcotics proceeds.
1
  The District Court denied St. Vallier‟s 
motion on July 8, 2009.  
On August 3, 2009, the District Court sentenced St. Vallier to 204 months of 
incarceration followed by five years of supervised release.  Prior to and during the 
sentencing proceeding, St. Vallier contested the guidelines calculation of his criminal 
history category as set forth within his Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”).  Specifically, St. 
Vallier contended that the PSR contained an error indicating that he served the entirety of 
                                              
1
  On appeal, St. Vallier reiterates these two particular arguments.  See infra II. A., 
B., and C.  
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a 364 day term of incarceration pursuant to an earlier conviction when, according to him, 
the sentence was actually suspended.
2
   
When factored into the overall calculation, the presence of this allegedly mistaken 
period of incarceration resulted in the addition of three points to St. Vallier‟s criminal 
history category.  The District Court overruled St. Vallier‟s objections, finding that 
representations provided by defense counsel were insufficient to dispute the accuracy of 
the PSR.  Accordingly, when calculating St. Vallier‟s sentence for the current offenses, 
the court took the prior sentence into account as represented in the PSR.  Following 
sentencing, the Government confirmed that St. Vallier‟s 364 day sentence was indeed 
suspended as claimed. 
 St. Vallier now appeals both his conviction and sentence.  
II. 
The District Court possessed jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction over the challenges to the conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and over 
the challenges to the sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
A.  Motion to Suppress 
                                              
2
  The Probation Office overruled St. Vallier‟s initial objections based on a phone 
conversation with a representative from the Clerk‟s Office of the Superior Court for 
Essex County, who confirmed that St. Vallier had received a sentence of 364 days of 
incarceration.  (PSR ¶ 64.)  During the sentencing proceeding, the Assistant United States 
Attorney did not produce evidence to prove the disputed PSR allegation, and instead 
argued that even if St. Vallier had in fact received a suspended sentence, the difference 
would not affect the ultimate calculation of his criminal history category.  This assertion 
later proved incorrect, as conceded by the Government.  (Government‟s Br. at 42.)  
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St. Vallier argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress 
statements made to customs officials at Newark Liberty Airport.
3
  In support of this 
claim, St. Vallier contends that he was subjected to custodial interrogation from the 
moment customs officers directed him to leave the general customs area of the airport 
terminal.  Therefore, he argues, customs officers were required to provide Miranda 
warnings prior to questioning and that their failure to do so renders his statements 
inadmissible at trial.   
The District Court rejected similar arguments during the suppression hearing and 
denied St. Vallier‟s motion based on its determination that he was not subjected to 
custodial interrogation for Miranda purposes, given that the questioning occurred at the 
international border.  The court explained that at the time St. Vallier was questioned by 
Customs Officer Erraez, “he was not free to leave, but he was not – it was not a custodial 
interrogation for purposes of Miranda.”  (Supp. App. at 67.)  The court went on to explain 
that “[t]here are certain exceptions that have been provided as it relates to custodial 
interrogation, specifically as it relates to border situations.”  (Id.)  “This was clearly a 
border situation,” the court found, and “[the] questions that were being asked . . . did not 
rise to a custodial interrogation, [therefore] . . . there is no need for Miranda warnings to 
                                              
3
  St. Vallier does not specifically identify which statements made to customs 
officials are at issue here, and instead argues that all of the statements he made once 
within the secondary inspection area should have been suppressed.  (St. Vallier‟s Br. at 
11.)  Based on our review of the trial and suppression hearing transcripts, it appears that 
the statements of relevance here include: St. Vallier‟s explanation that he traveled to 
Trinidad on vacation; his statement that he did not know LaRoche; and his subsequent 
contradictory statement that LaRoche was McCombs‟ girlfriend.  (See Supp. App. at 52-
55, 67.)  
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be given to Mr. St. Vallier.”  (Id.)  Accordingly, the court denied the motion.  For the 
reasons that follow, we conclude that this denial was proper.  
We review the District Court‟s factual findings in a suppression hearing for clear 
error.  United States v. Naranjo, 426 F.3d 221, 226 (3d Cir. 2005).  Alternatively, our 
review of legal rulings and mixed questions of law and fact is plenary.  Id.   
It is well-settled that an individual is entitled to Miranda warnings where the 
government seeks to perform a custodial interrogation.  See, e.g., United States v. Walton, 
10 F.3d 1024, 1026 (3d Cir. 1993).  As a general rule, Miranda warnings are required to 
protect a suspect‟s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.  Miranda, 384 U.S. 
at 444-45.  Thus, prior to asking any questions of a suspect in custody, law enforcement 
officers must provide appropriate warnings and notification of rights.  Id.  Any statement 
that is the product of unwarned custodial interrogation may be barred from use at trial by 
the exclusionary rule.  See United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 179-80 (3d Cir. 
2001). 
A person is subject to custodial interrogation when both the elements of custody 
and interrogation are satisfied.  Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980).  An 
individual is in custody if, given the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, “a 
reasonable person would have felt that he or she was not at liberty to terminate the 
interrogation and leave.”  Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).  Interrogation, 
for Miranda purposes refers to express questioning or its “functional equivalent.”  Innis, 
446 U.S. at 300-01. 
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As observed by this Court, normal Miranda rules are, however, inapplicable to 
circumstances where border inspectors question persons seeking entry into the United 
States.  United States v. Kiam, 432 F.3d 524, 529-30 (3d Cir. 2006) (describing the 
“responsibility of immigration or customs agents to inspect entrants at our borders” and 
explaining that while persons questioned are “unquestionably in „custody‟ . . . normal 
Miranda rules simply cannot apply to this unique situation at the border”). 4   
Furthermore, whether an individual is questioned in a primary inspection line or removed 
from the line for secondary inspection has no bearing on the inapplicability of normal 
Miranda rules under such circumstances.  See id. at 530.   
On appeal, St. Vallier contends that he was in custody from the time he was 
approached by customs officials and consequently that the subsequent questioning absent 
Miranda warnings was impermissible.  In making this argument, St. Vallier places undue 
emphasis on whether or not he was “in custody,” and in doing so ignores our holding in 
Kiam.  Even if St. Vallier was “in custody” for purposes of Miranda, it does not follow 
                                              
4
 The Presentence Report indicates that St. Vallier is a U.S. Citizen.  (PSR at 2.)  
We note that in Kiam the questioning pertained to the admissibility of Kiam, an alien, 
into the United States, whereas here, if St. Vallier is a U.S. Citizen, the questioning 
would pertain to whether St. Vallier could bring his effects into the United States.  In 
short, Kiam focused on immigration questioning, whereas here, we are faced with 
customs questioning.  Nonetheless, Kiam indicated that its reasoning applied to both 
immigration and customs officials, and that those officials had to determine whether both 
persons and their effects were entitled to enter the country.  Kiam, 432 F.3d at 531 
(“Regardless of whether an immigrations inspector had probable cause to arrest for a 
criminal violation, a customs officer remained „duty bound to determine whether [the 
alien] was entitled to enter the country with her effects.‟ (quoting United States v. Silva, 
715 F.2d 43, 48 (2d Cir. 1983)).  Consequently, we find no material distinction between 
questioning an alien to determine whether he is entitled to enter the country and 
questioning a U.S. Citizen to determine whether his effects are entitled to enter the 
country. 
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that Officer Erraez was required to provide relevant warnings before conducting the 
questioning that occurred here.  See Kiam, 432 F.3d at 529.  Custody is not dispositive in 
the context of border questioning.  See id.  Thus, while St. Vallier may have been in 
custody for Miranda purposes, for the reasons we explained in Kiam, this alone does not 
render Officer Erraez‟s questioning improper.  
Having addressed St. Vallier‟s custody argument, we now turn to the issue of 
whether the questions asked by Officer Erraez crossed the boundary we articulated in 
Kiam.
5
  In Kiam, we acknowledged that at some point a line must be drawn after which 
Miranda requirements might apply even in the context of border questioning.  Kiam, 432 
F.3d at 530.  Therein, we explained that “[i]f the inspector‟s questions objectively cease 
to have a bearing on the grounds for admissibility and instead only further a potential 
criminal prosecution, however, this line has been crossed.”  Id.  Importantly, in 
acknowledging this limitation, we refused to “hold that if a customs official subjectively 
suspects criminal conduct in addition to inadmissibility, he must Mirandize the alien 
before questioning him on any subject.”  Id.   
This pronouncement reflects the practical reality that determinations regarding the 
admissibility of persons or importation of effects often involve an initial assessment of 
whether a person is engaged in criminal activity.  See, e.g., id. (border inspector properly 
                                              
5
  On appeal, St. Vallier cites our decision in Kiam for the proposition that Miranda 
warnings are required once customs officials have completed their admissibility 
determination and move on to ask questions that only further a criminal prosecution.  (St. 
Vallier‟s Br. at 13.)  He stops short of explicitly arguing that Officer Erraez crossed this 
line; however, to the extent that his discussion of Kiam insinuates that this line was 
crossed, we disagree. 
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questioned appellant about his prior travels and association with other passengers on his 
arrival flight as part of admissibility determination relating to concerns of ongoing human 
smuggling operation);  United States v. Moya, 74 F.3d 1117 (11th Cir. 1996) (permitting 
an immigration inspector to question an alien, without Miranda warnings, after an INS 
system indicated that the alien had previously been deported and was therefore 
potentially attempting the criminal act of illegal reentry).  A criminal offense, such as 
illegal reentry, may be inextricably tied to a person‟s admissibility, yet customs officers 
are not required to provide Miranda warnings prior to asking questions that might bear 
upon this illegal conduct.  See Kiam, 432 F.3d at 531.  The same is true when an officer 
may suspect that an individual or that individual‟s effects must be interdicted because of 
a presently occurring effort or ongoing conspiracy to smuggle drugs across the 
international border.  Accordingly, “[s]uspicion of criminal conduct [does not] overrule 
the simultaneous responsibility of immigration or customs agents to inspect entrants at 
our borders.”  Id.  Similarly, questions that bear upon both admissibility and criminal 
conduct, while not relating solely to prosecution of the latter, do not cross the boundary 
we articulated in Kiam.  See id.  
The questions asked by Officer Erraez did not cross the line we enunciated in 
Kiam.  Although they were arguably directed at determining whether St. Vallier was 
involved in ongoing criminal activity,
6
 they were still integral to Officer Erraez‟s 
                                              
6
  Officer Erraez testified that when St. Vallier was diverted for questioning he was 
informed by other customs officials of various red flags including St. Vallier‟s prior 
criminal record, the fact that he had paid for LaRoche‟s ticket, the observation that all 
three individuals went to separate lines in spite of travel affiliations, and that they had 
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determination of whether St. Vallier‟s effects could enter the country.7  Officer Erraez‟s 
inquiries into St. Vallier‟s motives for traveling to Trinidad and his associations with 
other passengers on his arrival flight reasonably sought to establish basic facts relevant to 
such a determination.  At the time of questioning, St. Vallier had neither admitted to nor 
been found in possession of direct evidence of criminal activity, even though information 
suggested that he and his co-conspirators were providing false answers to customs 
officers.  The fact that neither contraband nor an admission of criminal conduct had been 
obtained at this juncture further reinforces our conclusion that Officer Erraez‟s 
questioning fell comfortably within the boundary we delineated in Kiam.  Therein we 
suggested that an admission of criminal conduct or discovery of drugs might represent a 
transition point after which questioning could only practically relate to a potential 
criminal prosecution.  Kiam, 432 F.3d at 530 n.6.  Moreover, once Officer Erraez learned 
that cocaine was discovered in LaRoche‟s luggage, all examination ceased.  (Supp. App. 
at 57.)  For these reasons, we conclude that Officer Erraez was not required to provide 
Miranda warnings prior to eliciting the responses at issue here.   
Finding no error in the District Court‟s factual or legal conclusions, we will affirm 
the District Court‟s denial of St. Vallier‟s motion to suppress the statements he made to 
                                                                                                                                                  
arrived following a short trip to “a source country for narcotics.”  (Supp. App. at 47-50, 
251.)   
7
  Customs officials are explicitly authorized to search and examine persons entering 
the United States, and seize contraband.  See 19 U.S.C. § 1467; 19 C.F.R. §§ 162.6 & 
162.21.  Moreover, federal regulations prohibit the importation of controlled substances.  
19 C.F.R. § 162.61.  Thus, whether St. Vallier was attempting to smuggle controlled 
substances into the country from Trinidad had a direct bearing on the admissibility of his 
effects.   
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customs officials in Liberty International Airport.  We also note that even if the District 
Court had erred in denying St. Vallier‟s motion to suppress, we would view the error as 
harmless since other evidence introduced at trial independently established the critical 
facts contained in his statements to customs officers.  
B.  Attempt to Impeach McCombs and Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct 
St. Vallier raises two claims concerning testimony presented at trial regarding his 
alleged use of various phones in furtherance of the importation conspiracy.  First, he 
challenges a purported evidentiary ruling by the District Court, which, he contends, 
prevented him from introducing critical impeachment material that would have 
discredited McCombs by revealing instances of perjury he allegedly committed at trial.
8
  
Second, St. Vallier suggests that the Government violated his due process rights by 
knowingly using McCombs‟ allegedly perjurious testimony.  Both of these claims fail.  
During trial, McCombs testified on direct examination that St. Vallier routinely 
used different cell phones, and that he witnessed St. Vallier speaking with persons from 
Trinidad on at least one of those phones.  (Supp. App. at 354-60.)  On cross-examination, 
                                              
8
  On appeal, St. Vallier‟s arguments center on his purported efforts to impeach 
McCombs through another witness, ICE Agent Thomas Sharpe.  At one point when 
summarizing his argument, however, St. Vallier writes that the court erred by “not 
allow[ing] defense counsel to adequately cross examine the Government‟s key witness, 
Ezra McCombs . . . .”  (St.Vallier‟s Br. at 17 (emphasis added).)  Nowhere else does St. 
Vallier assert that the court erred by limiting his examination of McCombs.  Nor does he 
provide any pertinent citations to the record or develop this argument elsewhere.  As 
such, we will only address at length his arguments concerning the effect of the purported 
limits on his examination of Agent Sharpe.  See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (“It is also well-settled . . . that casual mention of an issue in a brief is cursory 
treatment insufficient to preserve the issue on appeal.”).  Nonetheless, we note that our 
review of the record does not indicate any error in the court‟s rulings during St. Vallier‟s 
cross-examination of McCombs at trial.  
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defense counsel for St. Vallier proceeded to question McCombs as to whether he made 
certain statements regarding St. Vallier‟s phone use to ICE Agent Thomas Sharpe, later 
reflected in a warrant affidavit submitted by the agent.  (Id. at 437-39.)   
Following the close of the Government‟s case, St. Vallier requested permission to 
call Agent Sharpe as a defense witness, explaining his desire to inquire about steps taken 
by the Government to investigate the various phone numbers discussed at trial.  (Supp. 
App. at 547.)  Defense counsel never mentioned during arguments before the court the 
intent to bring Sharpe forward specifically for the purpose of impeaching McCombs.  
After consideration of arguments from both sides, the court ruled as follows: 
The Court: All right.  You can call Agent Sharpe.  To be honest with you, I 
don‟t know where we‟re going with it, and if your purpose for calling him 
is about the phone numbers, then it is a very limited area.  And I don‟t want 
us to go off track and get into all these different phone calls, and what did 
your investigation consist of, and that sort of thing.   
[Defense Counsel]: No, I want to know: Did you investigate this number?  
Did you determine this number was a landline?  Did you determine that no 
calls were made from this phone to Trinidad? 
The Court:  All right. 
(Supp. App. at 550.)  Consistent with the colloquy above, the District Court permitted St. 
Vallier to call Agent Sharpe.  (Id. at 588.) 
 St. Vallier examined Sharpe regarding his efforts to obtain records for various 
phone numbers presented through prior testimony.  (Id. at 588-95.)  St. Vallier 
additionally asked Sharpe about several numbers associated with the Appellant, and 
whether records indicated that any of those numbers were used to call Trinidad.  (Id. at 
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592-94.)  Defense counsel ended questioning thereafter and declined to conduct redirect.  
(Id. at 595-96.) 
 As to St. Vallier‟s first claim, our review of the transcript provides no indication 
that the District Court limited St. Vallier‟s examination of Agent Sharpe in any way that 
prevented the impeachment of McCombs.  Although the District Court initially sought to 
restrict the scope of examination prior to agreeing to allow St. Vallier to call Sharpe, the 
court subsequently acquiesced and allowed St. Vallier to proceed without limitation.  
When Sharpe was on the witness stand, St. Vallier never asked whether McCombs made 
affirmative statements to him regarding St. Vallier‟s use of certain phones to call 
Trinidad in furtherance of the conspiracy.  Instead, Sharpe was asked to examine the 
contents of a phone in evidence that belonged to McCombs, not St. Vallier, and about 
steps taken to investigate various phone numbers discussed at trial.  (Id. at 588-95.)  
Finally, the three objections sustained by the District Court during defense counsel‟s 
examination of Sharpe related solely to issues of leading questions and imposed no 
limitations on the substance of the examination.  Thus, St. Vallier‟s claim that the District 
Court prevented impeachment of McCombs is entirely unsupported by the record.  To the 
contrary, the record indicates that St. Vallier‟s decision not to elicit impeaching testimony 
was self-imposed.  St. Vallier cannot now transform that choice into judicial error.  See 
United States v. Strothers, 77 F.3d 1389, 1393 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  Thus, St. Vallier‟s claim 
fails.  
 St. Vallier also suggests that the Government violated his due process rights 
through prosecutorial misconduct.  Specifically, St. Vallier contends that the Government 
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knowingly used perjurious testimony when it permitted McCombs to deny making 
various statements to Agent Sharpe regarding the Appellant‟s use of a specific cellular 
phone in furtherance of the importation conspiracy.  To succeed on this claim, St. Vallier 
bears the burden of establishing that: (1) McCombs committed perjury; (2) the 
Government knew or should have known that McCombs committed perjury but failed to 
correct his testimony; and (3) there is a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony 
could have affected the verdict.  United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 183 (3d Cir. 
2008).  A witness commits perjury if he “gives false testimony concerning a material 
matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of 
confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.”  United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 
(1993).  Because St. Vallier cannot meet his burden as to the first element, we need not 
address the second and third.  
 St. Vallier‟s claim that McCombs committed perjury centers on the following 
testimony: 
Q: Do you recall speaking to Agent Sharpe?   
A: Yes. 
. . .  
Q: And during those conversations, did you tell him that Tyshaun St. 
Vallier used his cellular telephone to call Trinidad to make arrangements 
for these drug deals? 
A: No, I never told him that. 
[Defense Counsel]: I‟ll ask that Agent Sharpe be available for the defense 
case, please.  Thank you.  
The Court: Alright. 
Q: So you deny telling him that Tyshaun used his cell phone to call 
Trinidad? 
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A: I told him that on occasion that me and Tyshaun both spoke on phones 
in Trinidad, yes. 
Q: You didn‟t tell him Tyshaun‟s cell phone number by number? 
A: No.  
Q: You didn‟t tell him that he used a Samsung assigned telephone number 
[redacted] in order – a prepaid phone and that you didn‟t tell him that he 
used that number to call Trinidad? 
A: No, I didn‟t. 
. . .  
Q: . . . So you are actually denying that you told Agent Sharpe that the calls 
were made on Tyshaun St. Vallier‟s cell phone; is that correct? 
A: I‟m not denying that calls were made on his cell phone.  I‟m saying that 
I didn‟t tell him that he made the calls. 
Q: But you‟re saying that Tyshaun St. Vallier did make calls on his cell 
phone? 
A: On his cell phone, yes. 
Q: Even though there‟s no record of any call to Trinidad on his cell phone? 
A: Right. I told you he had other phones. 
 
(Supp. App. at 438-39, 443.) 
St. Vallier‟s assertion that McCombs lied when providing the answers excerpted 
above rests on his reading of an amended search warrant affidavit submitted by Agent 
Sharpe on April 1, 2009.  (Sharpe Amend. Affidavit at ¶¶ 9-11.)  In this affidavit, Agent 
Sharpe averred that McCombs told him that St. Vallier used a specific cellular phone, 
which was the subject of the search warrant, to call and text Trinidad in furtherance of the 
importation conspiracy.
9
  St. Vallier argues that the contents of this affidavit necessarily 
                                              
9
  In pertinent part, the affidavit provides that:  
 
     “9. I am informed by Ezra McCombs . . . that Tyshaun St. Vallier used the Subject 
Telephone in furtherance of the conspiracy to import cocaine.  10. Specifically, I was 
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demonstrate that McCombs lied, that the Government was aware of this fact, and that the 
Government nonetheless “[held] him out as truthful . . . .”  (St. Vallier‟s Br. at 19.)   
We review a district court‟s factual finding that a witness‟s testimony was not 
false for clear error, and “will not disturb that finding unless it is wholly unsupported by 
the evidence.”  Hoffecker, 530 F.3d at 183.  St. Vallier first raised this claim in his 
memorandum of law in support of his motion for a new trial.  The District Court orally 
denied St. Vallier‟s motion without making an explicit finding with respect to his 
allegations of perjury.   
Even absent such a finding by the District Court, St. Vallier cannot show on 
appeal that McCombs committed perjury.  Although we recognize that McCombs‟ 
statement that he “never told” Agent Sharpe that St. Vallier “used his cellular telephone 
to call Trinidad to make arrangements for these drug deals” can be read as conflicting 
with Sharpe‟s amended affidavit, it is not clear that his response was anything more than 
the product of confusion, and certainly does not prove that McCombs willfully intended 
to provide false testimony.  See Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 94 (“A witness testifying under 
oath or affirmation [commits perjury] if she gives false testimony concerning a material 
matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of 
confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.”).  McCombs testified that St. Vallier routinely 
used multiple cell phones.  He additionally attempted to explain the apparent conflict 
                                                                                                                                                  
informed by Ezra McCombs that Tyshaun St. Vallier used the Subject Telephone to 
call individuals in Trinidad who had agreed to supply them with the cocaine seized on 
May 6, 2007 by ICE.  11.  I was also informed by Ezra McCombs that Tyshaun St. 
Vallier used the Subject Telephone to text individuals in furtherance of the conspiracy 
. . . .”  (Sharpe Amend. Affidavit at ¶¶ 9-11.)   
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between the affidavit and his testimony at trial by suggesting that the calls to Trinidad 
were simply made on one of St. Vallier‟s several phones, but not the one referenced in 
the affidavit.  (Supp. App. at 443.)  Defense counsel‟s questioning also appears to 
presume that St. Vallier was the source of the actual phone number associated with the 
cell phone referenced in Agent Sharpe‟s affidavit.  Nowhere in the affidavit does it state 
that St. Vallier provided the actual number, as opposed to simply identifying the phone 
based on physical appearance.
10
  Given the existence of multiple phones and associated 
numbers, we are not convinced that the conflict between McCombs‟ first denial and 
Agent Sharpe‟s characterization of McCombs‟ statements in the affidavit establishes 
perjury.  See Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 94. 
 Because St. Vallier cannot show that McCombs committed perjury, his claim that 
the Government violated his due process rights through the knowing use of false 
testimony necessarily fails.  
C.  Testimony by Agent Riley 
 St. Vallier next argues that the District Court erred by preventing him from 
introducing evidence to counter testimony at trial that could have suggested to the jury 
that funds seized from him on the day of his arrest were narcotics proceeds.  For the 
reasons that follow, we find this claim unavailing.   
                                              
10
  On direct examination, McCombs was questioned about the contents of the 
cellular phone and was permitted to answer based on his ability to physically identify it 
rather than based on his knowledge of the specific number associated with the phone.  
(See Supp. App. at 357.) 
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 During trial, ICE Agent Mike Riley testified that $3,694 was recovered from St. 
Vallier on May 6, 2007, the day of his arrest.  (Supp. App. at 475.)  When asked “[d]oes 
ICE routinely seize – any time money is taken off of an arrestee, does ICE routinely seize 
that money?,” Agent Riley responded, “[n]o.” He then began to comment that, “[i]f we 
believe that the money is part of narcotics proceeds --” prompting an objection by 
defense counsel, which the District Court sustained  (id. (emphasis added)).  On cross-
examination, St. Vallier attempted to introduce a settlement agreement he entered into 
with the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (id. at 483-84), which he argues 
would have illustrated that the seized funds originated from legitimate sources, thereby 
remedying the impression potentially created by Agent Riley‟s earlier comment.  Upon 
proffer, the Government objected for lack of foundation.  (Id. at 484.)  Agent Riley 
confirmed that he had never before seen the agreement and had no personal knowledge of 
it.  Accordingly, the District Court sustained the objection, thereby preventing St. Vallier 
from questioning ICE Agent Riley regarding the settlement agreement at issue here.   
 The District Court did not err in making this evidentiary ruling.  We review a 
district court‟s “decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion.”  United 
States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 497 (3d Cir. 2006).  The Federal Rules of Evidence forbid a 
witness from testifying as to a matter “unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support 
a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.”  FED. R. EVID. 602; see 
also United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117, 128 (3d Cir. 1989).  Here, Agent Riley 
clearly lacked personal knowledge about the settlement agreement.  Thus, the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the Government‟s objection.  
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 Finally, we are unmoved by St. Vallier‟s contention that the comment by Agent 
Sharpe created irreparable damage by leaving the jury with the impression that the funds 
were drug proceeds.  Even if Agent Riley‟s comment initially gave such an impression, 
St. Vallier was able to introduce ample testimony to the contrary.  For example, 
McCombs noted that St. Vallier won money while gambling in Trinidad.  (Supp. App. at 
429.)  St. Vallier‟s sister testified that their mother provided him with roughly $20,000 to 
start a business at some point prior to the trip to Trinidad.  (Id. at 503.)  Additionally, St. 
Vallier elicited explicit testimony from Agent Riley that Riley was unaware of the source 
of the seized funds and that the money could have come from legitimate sources.  (Id. at 
485.)  Finally, defense counsel stressed each of these points during closing arguments, 
and the District Court instructed the jury not to consider as evidence answers to questions 
to which the Court sustained an objection.  (Id. at 655, 699.)  The existence of this 
countering testimony coupled with the court‟s instruction undermines St. Vallier‟s 
contention that Agent Riley‟s comment created irreparable harm.  
D.  Motion for New Trial 
 St. Vallier next asserts that the District Court erred in denying his motion for a 
new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33,
11
 which provides that 
“[u]pon the defendant‟s motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial 
                                              
11
  Defense counsel initially submitted St. Vallier‟s motion for a new trial under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c), which challenges a jury verdict based on the 
sufficiency of the evidence.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(c).  It is clear from the record before us, 
including the hearing on this motion, that defense counsel intended to submit the motion 
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.  Accordingly, we will treat the motion as 
filed under Rule 33. 
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if the interest of justice so requires.”  FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(a).  “Unlike an insufficiency of 
the evidence claim, when a district court evaluates a Rule 33 motion it does not view the 
evidence favorably to the [g]overnment, but instead exercises its own judgment in 
assessing the [g]overnment‟s case.”  United States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 150 (3d Cir. 
2002) (citations omitted).  A district court may “order a new trial only if it believes that 
there is a serious danger that a miscarriage of justice has occurred–that is, that an 
innocent person has been convicted.”  United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 1004-05 
(3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  “We review the denial of 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 33 for abuse of discretion.”  Id. at 1005 (citation 
omitted).   
 St. Vallier challenges the District Court‟s denial of his motion for a new trial by 
referencing the arguments set forth in Section II of his brief and asserting that their 
reconsideration by this Court in the context of a Rule 33 motion evinces the need for a 
new trial.
12
  (St. Vallier‟s Br. at 23.)  Potentially narrowing the scope of his argument 
further, St. Vallier cites only the allegedly perjurious testimony by McCombs, and insists 
                                              
12
  Restated, these arguments include St. Vallier‟s claims that: (1) the District Court 
erred by preventing the impeachment of Ezra McCombs; (2) the Government violated his 
Fourteenth Amendment rights by knowingly using perjured testimony; and (3) the 
District Court erred by precluding the introduction of evidence showing that the funds 
seized from St. Vallier on the day of his arrest were procured from legitimate sources.  St. 
Vallier‟s motion for a new trial was based on several grounds; however, because he limits 
his arguments on appeal to those raised in Section II of his brief, we decline to consider 
the other arguments St. Vallier presented before the District Court in support of his 
motion for a new trial.  See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(9) (brief must include the “argument, 
which must contain . . . [the] appellant's contentions and the reasons for them, with 
citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies[.]”). 
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that a new trial is required because “the blatant and unchecked perjury . . . could have 
affected the judgment of the jury.  (Id. at 24.) 
 In light of our conclusions set forth above, we find no error in the District Court‟s 
denial of St. Vallier‟s Rule 33 motion.  As this Court observed in Silveus, Rule 33 
“motions are not favored and should be granted sparingly and only in exceptional cases.” 
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  In denying St. Vallier‟s motion, the 
District Court described the evidence against St. Vallier as “overwhelming” and noted 
that “[t]his was not a case that dealt with Mr. McCombs versus Mr. St. Vallier.”  (Id. at 
763.)  Given the additional inculpating evidence cited by the District Court, which 
included testimony by law enforcement officers as well as St. Vallier‟s co-conspirator 
LaRoche, ample basis existed for the District Court to determine that a new trial was not 
merited.  McCombs‟ testimony regarding St. Vallier‟s purported use of a phone to call 
Trinidad was not indispensible to his conviction, and we do not believe that even if 
McCombs lied, the effect would have changed the outcome of St. Vallier‟s trial.   
Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by 
denying St. Vallier‟s Rule 33 motion for a new trial.  
E.  Ineffective Assistance 
St. Vallier additionally argues that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
in three ways.  First, he contends that his original attorney, Paul Bergrin, Esq., misguided, 
coerced, and threatened him in the early stages of representation, thereby inadequately 
preparing him for trial.  Second, St. Vallier asserts that his newly appointed attorney 
failed to secure phone records in advance of trial that were crucial to his defense.  Lastly, 
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St. Vallier argues that trial counsel failed to effectively cross-examine the Government‟s 
key witness in order to impeach him regarding statements made about the contents of the 
suitcases in which authorities found cocaine.   
This Court generally does not entertain Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) on a direct appeal.  
See, e.g., United States v. McLaughlin, 386 F.3d 547, 556 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Thorton, 327 F.3d 268, 271 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 
1083 (3d Cir. 1991).  Our reluctance to consider Strickland claims on direct review is 
based on the fact that “such claims frequently involve questions regarding conduct that 
occurred outside the purview of the district court and therefore can be resolved only after 
a factual development at an appropriate hearing.”  Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 
F.2d 125, 133 (3d Cir. 1984) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also United 
States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587, 598 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[T]he proper avenue for 
pursuing such a claim is through a collateral proceeding.”). 
We have, however, recognized a narrow exception to this general rule.  “[W]here 
the record is sufficient to allow determination of ineffective assistance of counsel, an 
evidentiary hearing to develop the facts is not needed.”  Headley, 923 F.2d at 1083.  The 
case before us does not fall within this narrow exception.  
The record requires further development in several respects before we can 
properly evaluate St. Vallier‟s ineffective assistance claims.  As an initial matter, even 
accepting St. Vallier‟s allegations against Attorney Bergrin as true, it is entirely unclear 
to us how his actions bear upon the presently appealed conviction given that new counsel 
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was appointed months before trial.
13
  This observation aside, the two affidavits contained 
in the record setting forth the allegations against Attorney Bergrin speak only to the 
purported consequences with respect to St. Vallier‟s failed appearance at a pre-trial 
hearing.  They offer no insight into how Bergrin‟s actions affected St. Vallier‟s 
preparation for trial and the resulting conviction.  Thus, this claim, if having any merit, is 
not ready for review.  
Similarly, St. Vallier‟s other two arguments relating to ineffective assistance on 
the part of his trial counsel require further development.  On the record before us, we are 
unable to determine why Attorney Liebesman chose not to subpoena the phone records at 
issue here prior to the start of trial.  Likewise, the appellate record is inadequate for us to 
determine what factors led Ms. Liebesman not to impeach McCombs on statements he 
made about actions purportedly taken by he and the Appellant when packing the suitcases 
containing cocaine.  During post-trial arguments, defense counsel contended that she 
merely forgot; however, this is not enough for us to conduct “a comprehensive inquiry 
into the elements of strategy or tactics that may have entered into defense counsel‟s 
challenged decision.”  McLaughlin, 386 F.3d at 555. 
None of St. Vallier‟s Strickland claims fit within the narrow class amenable to 
review on direct appeal.  St. Vallier‟s ineffective assistance of counsel claims are thus 
premature.  Accordingly, we will deny these claims without prejudice to his right to raise 
them on collateral attack.  See Thorton, 327 F.3d at 272. 
                                              
13
  According to the Docket Sheet provided in the record on appeal, Attorney Ruth M. 
Liebesman replaced Attorney Bergrin as defense counsel on January 7, 2009.  Trial 
commenced on April 20, 2009, almost four months later.   
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D.  Sentencing 
Lastly, St. Vallier challenges the sentence imposed by the District Court, arguing 
that it is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.  Because we conclude that the 
District Court committed a procedural error, we need not address St. Vallier‟s latter 
argument.    
On August 3, 2009, the District Court sentenced St. Vallier to 204 months of 
incarceration.  Prior to and during the sentencing proceeding, St. Vallier objected to the 
guidelines calculation of his criminal history category provided by the Probation Office 
in his PSR.  Specifically, St. Vallier claimed that the PSR contained an error indicating 
that he served the entirety of a 364 day sentence pursuant to an earlier conviction when, 
according to him, the sentence was actually suspended.  Consideration of this prior 
sentence resulted in the addition of three points to St. Vallier‟s criminal history 
category.
14
  The District Court overruled St. Vallier‟s objections, and when calculating 
St. Vallier‟s sentence for the current offenses, took the prior sentence into account as 
represented in the PSR.   
Following sentencing, the Government confirmed that St. Vallier‟s 364 day 
sentence was in fact suspended.  On appeal, the Government concedes that the District 
Court relied on inaccurate information contained in the PSR and urges this Court to 
                                              
14
  Two criminal history points were assessed based on the Probation Office‟s belief 
that the earlier conviction resulted in a prior sentence of more than sixty days but less 
than thirteen months, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(b).  An additional criminal history 
point was assessed pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d) based on the Probation Office‟s 
belief that St. Vallier had served 364 days of incarceration and committed the instant 
offense within two years of his release. 
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vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing using an accurate criminal history 
category and appropriate guidelines range.  (Government‟s Br. at 39.) 
“If the district court commits procedural error, our preferred course is to remand 
the case for re-sentencing, without going any further.”  United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 
203, 214 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 328 (3d Cir. 
2007)).  Here, the District Court clearly committed a procedural error by relying on the 
erroneous information contained in St. Vallier‟s PSR.   
Accordingly, we will vacate St. Vallier‟s 204 month sentence and remand this 
matter for resentencing in light of the correct information now available.   
III.   
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s judgment of 
conviction.  Due to the procedural error discussed above, we will vacate St. Vallier‟s 
sentence and remand for resentencing before the District Court.  
 
